Le Centre des études de sécurité de l’IFRI a récemment publié le numéro 39 de la série Proliferation Papers intitulé:

In Defense of Deterrence: the Relevance, Morality and Cost-Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons

L’auteur, Bruno Tertrais, est maître de recherche à la Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) et membre de l’International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). En 2007-2008, il était membre de la Commission du Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale et de la Commission du Livre blanc sur la politique étrangère et européenne.

En 2010, il a reçu le Prix Vauban pour l’ensemble de son œuvre. Il est l’auteur, parmi de nombreuses publications, de War Without End (New York, The New Press, 2005).

Résumé de l’article:

Since 1945, nuclear deterrence has frequently been the target of continuous criticism on strategic, legal and moral grounds. In the past five years, however, the renewed debate on nuclear disarmament has been accompanied by an increase in such criticism. The alleged limited value of nuclear weapons vis-à-vis proliferation and terrorism, and the existence of alternatives such as high-precision conventional means and missile defense, have strengthened some of these arguments against nuclear deterrence. This Proliferation Paper attempts to offer a proper defense of nuclear deterrence, by reaffirming its validity as a war-prevention mechanism and by responding to the main criticisms that it faces. Finally, it reasserts the fact that maintaining and nurturing nuclear deterrence should remain a primary objective of Western governments.

Table des matières:

Introduction

Nuclear Deterrence Works

Nuclear Deterrence Is Neither Immoral nor Illegal

Nuclear Deterrence Is Cost-Effective

Nuclear Deterrence Remains Fully Relevant

Le papier peut être téléchargé ici.

N’hésitez pas à nous faire part de vos commentaires!

Le Centre des études de sécurité de l’Ifri vient de publier le numéro 21 bis de la série Focus stratégique, intitulé :

Toward the End of Force Projection? II. Operational Responses and Political Perspectives

L’auteur, Corentin Brustlein, est chercheur au Laboratoire de recherche sur la défense de l’Ifri, rédacteur en chef adjoint des Proliferation Papers et contribue également à ce blog.

L’article est téléchargeable ici.

Vous l’aurez peut-être deviné, il s’agit de la traduction du second volume de l’étude réalisée en 2010, sur le déni d’accès et ses conséquences sur les armées occidentales – et notamment européennes. Le premier volume est, quant à lui, téléchargeable ici.

Voici l’abstract de l’article:

For more than a decade, US defense circles have been concerned about the emergence of capabilities and strategies, which, as they spread, risk imperiling the United States’ position in the world by their ability to disrupt or prevent force projection operations. Though most of the literature on such “anti-access” strategies focuses on the military aspects of the threat, this Focus stratégique – the second and last part of a two-part study – adopts a different perspective. Firstly, it considers the various means Western armed forces could rely on to confront anti-access strategies and conduct forcible entry operations, and assesses in particular the potential French and European contributions. Secondly, it argues that the problem of access cannot be studied in depth without taking into account its political dimension, which determines the operational freedom of action of both the interventionist powers and their adversaries. As was the case with the first part of the study, mostly centered on an analysis of current Iranian anti-access capabilities, this article is focused on examples taken from the Persian Gulf region.

Et le sommaire :

Introduction

Western Responses to Anti-Access Capabilities

The Primacy of the Political Framework

Conclusion

N’hésitez pas à nous faire part de vos commentaires !

Sometimes you wish you never accepted to review a friend’s book/article : you lack the time to read the document, and once you finally find a few minutes/hours to discover it, it proves disappointing (and it’s pretty hard to find an easy way to say that). Some other times, fortunately, it’s the opposite: you get just what you were looking for (but still have to find the right way to say it, not to look like you’re congratulating a friend for being a friend). I’m glad to write from the start that this monograph clearly belongs to the second group.

Of course, it cannot be said to be a huge surprise when someone studying both military innovation and nuclear weapons policies (curiously enough, not the two of them together) finds interest in a paper on the innovation processes that gave birth to US Navy’s ballistic missiles. Still, disappointment was a real possibility, either due to a lack of empirical research, superficial treatment of the issue, or lack of theorization. Again, you’ll find no such thing here.

In his monograph, Sébastien Miraglia, a researcher at the Oslo-based Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies (IFS), reviews the development of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program from its creation back in the 1950s, to the Trident II D5, which currently equips US Navy’s Ohio-class SSBNs (as well as Royal Navy’s 4 Vanguard-class subs). Sébastien’s argument is that initial orientations taken by the Navy’s office in charge, the Strategic Project Office (SPO) weighed on its future choices and constrained its ability to respond optimally to external stimuli for change, such as new nuclear policies. This, in turn, created serious risks of disconnection between requirements identified at the policy level and available capabilities. For instance, following the deployment of the Soviet Galosh anti-ballistic missile defense system, SPO chose to respond not through the development of penetration aids – a path taken by the USAF for its Minuteman II ICBMs – but by putting multiple, smaller warheads on top of US SLBMs (MIRVing, for those who might not be familiar with the issue). It didn’t follow that path because MIRVing seemed to be the optimal way to deal with the threat from these rudimentary defenses. It took a path that would allow it to make good use of previous R&D on MIRVing, avoid entry costs associated with such developments as penetration aids, all the while fulfilling what it considered its core missions: saturate defenses and strike “soft” targets such as urban areas.

As one may guess, the paper rests heavily on concepts and approaches drawn from historical institutionalism and sociology of organizations. What one may not guess is that in addition to using classics such as MacKenzie’s Inventing Accuracy, Sébastien made extensive use of historical, unpublished material/archives from the SPO and its successor, various memoranda and transcripts of interviews of individuals directly involved in the program.

The result is a highly readable, rigorous and insightful research, as well as a great opportunity to discover the inside story – or close to – of the program and to understand how technical and operational dilemmas were solved. A great read for anyone interested military innovation, technology development and US nuclear history.

The study is available online for free (here) but you may as well consider buying a softcover copy as the format is great (much better, for example, than SSI monographs). Also, take some time to visit the IFS website and the other one dedicated to their publications, as you’ll find lots of interesting stuff here (by the way, people at IFS are the ones you should thank for last year’s amazing special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies on the Information Revolution in Military Affairs).

Gratulerer, Sébastien !

Sébastien Miraglia, Nuclear strategy and the development of military technology. The case of the Fleet Ballistic Missile programme, Defence and Security Studies – Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (Institutt for Forsvarsstudier), 2/2010, 124 p. PDF or paper (free / 100 NOK or approx. ~USD 16.00)

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has just published a new Focus stratégique titled:

Toward the End of Force Projection? I. The Anti-Access Threat

The author is Corentin Brustlein, a research fellow in Ifri’s Defense Research Unit. He is also the deputy editor of the Proliferation Papers, and blogs at Ultima Ratio.

Abstract:

Force projection has become a general posture and a fundamental dimension of the influence Western powers intend to exert over the world by means of their armed forces. However, for the last fifteen years, Western states’ adoption of expeditionary postures has encouraged the proliferation of certain technologies. The latter favor strategies based on naval and air interdiction, and threaten to render foreign interventions too costly. This article thus seeks to provide some clues for understanding and assessing the threat anti-access strategies pose to Western, and especially European, force projection capabilities. In order to illustrate in a concrete way the potential problems regional adversaries can pose, this article will focus on assessing the Iranian anti-access threat.

Table of Contents:

Introduction
Force Projection  and the Anti-Access Threat
Countering Force  Projection Operations

This article is available on Ifri’s website.

Your comments are more than welcome!

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has recently published the issue #37 of its Proliferation Papers series entitled:

Russia’s Nuclear Forces: Between Disarmament and Modernization

The author, Pavel Podvig,  is an independent analyst based in Geneva, where he runs his research project, « Russian Nuclear Forces. » He maintains a website, “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces,” which includes a blog at http://russianforces.org/blog/.

Summary:

Nuclear weapons have traditionally occupied an important place in Russia’s national security strategy. As Russia and the United States have been reducing their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, their relationship has undergone a complex transformation. Russia, however, still considers strategic balance with the United States to be an important element of national security. During the recent arms control negotiations with the United States, Russia strongly emphasized its interest in missile defense and conventional strategic launchers – issues that might directly affect its deterrent potential and discourage deep reductions. Still, the nuclear disarmament process could also change Russia’s security policy in a variety of ways, depending on how the subsequent dialogue addresses several key issues. After an overview of the current status of the Russian strategic nuclear forces and the strategic modernization program undertaken by Russia, this Proliferation Paper considers the role that missile defense and tactical nuclear weapons could play during the next round of nuclear arms control negotiations. Each of these problems presents a serious challenge. Nevertheless, this analysis suggests that recent progress in nuclear disarmament and the willingness of both countries to engage in a dialogue give the two countries an opportunity to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in their relationship.

Contents:

Introduction
Strategic Nuclear Forces
Missile Defense
Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Conclusion

The paper is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!

Le Centre des études de sécurité de l’Ifri a récemment publié le Proliferation Paper n°36:

Strategic Stability in the Cold War. Lessons for Continuing Challenges

L’auteur est David S. Yost, Professeur à la U.S. Naval Postgraduate School à Monterey en Californie.

Résumé:

During the Cold War, the phrase “strategic stability” gained currency both as a foreign policy objective and as an apt way of describing the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union never actually went to war. To what extent did U.S. analytical models concerning “crisis stability,” “first-strike stability,” and “arms race stability” – and policies based on these models – contribute to the avoidance of war between the United States and the Soviet Union? This paper argues that, in light of Soviet and U.S. behavior at the time and in view of what has subsequently been learned about Soviet policies and decision-making, the proponents of these models have overestimated their utility. Today, the expression “strategic stability” is still widely used, for example in the U.S. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report. For this reason, and in the context of the forthcoming bilateral nuclear reductions, it may be useful to critically examine the cogency and relevance of these U.S. models from the Cold War period with a view to identifying lessons for current challenges.

Sommaire:

Introduction
U.S.-Soviet predominance and fear of nuclear war
American theories of stability during the Cold War
Lessons
Conclusion

Ce texte peut être téléchargé sur le site de l’Ifri.

Les arguments de l’auteur, notamment les leçons tirées, devraient susciter le débat, aussi si vous avez des commentaires n’hésitez pas!

Samedi 23 octobre, The Atlantic nous indique que l’US Air Force a connu un nouveau déboire avec les armes nucléaires dont elle a la responsabilité. On se souvient de l’envoi par erreur  de quatre composants du véhicule de rentrée Mk-12, en 2006, dans un conteneur à destination de Taïwan. Un an plus tard, un B-52H emportait à son bord douze missiles de croisière AGM-129 lors d’un vol entre Minot AFB et Barksdale AFB, sans savoir que six d’entre eux étaient équipés de têtes nucléaires au lieu des têtes d’entraînement. La conjonction des deux incidents avait alors amené Gates à « accepter la démission » des deux têtes de l’US Air Force, le Secrétaire de l’USAF Michael Wynne et son chef d’état major, le général T. Michael Moseley. [...]

Nous avions la chance d’accueillir à l’Ifri vendredi dernier Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Dans un discours d’une demi-heure (cf. les vidéos postées ici vendredi soir), le secrétaire général de l’OTAN a abordé les principaux sujets qui font débat au sein de l’Alliance, et s’est ensuite prêté de très bonne grâce au jeu des questions-réponses – et tout ceci pour l’essentiel en français. En dépit du caractère forcément officiel et convenu de ce type d’exercice, le SecGen s’est montré dans l’ensemble clair et direct. Quelques points méritent ainsi d’être relevés. [...]

Ces derniers mois, les déclarations d’officiels européens sur la défense antimissile balistique (DAMB) ont été de plus en plus fréquentes. Au scepticisme d’Hervé Morin répondait l’optimisme d’Anders F. Rasmussen, le premier s’appuyant sur des analogies peu flatteuses, le second n’hésitant pas à fournir des estimations très basses des coûts d’une DAMB continentale. Dernièrement, c’était au tour du groupe d’experts mené par Madeleine Albright de s’exprimer sur le sujet. Les passages de ce rapport, commenté page par page par Olivier Kempf, portant sur la DAMB sont les suivants :

[pages 11-12] La défense antimissile : une nouvelle mission. La nécessité de répondre à la menace d’une éventuelle attaque balistique de l’Iran a donné le jour à ce qui est devenu pour l’OTAN une mission militaire essentielle. La décision du président Obama de déployer une défense antimissile suivant une approche adaptative phasée rend possible une couverture plus efficace, plus rapide et plus fiable que les propositions antérieures. En outre, cette décision inscrit pleinement la défense antimissile dans un contexte OTAN, permettant ainsi à tous les Alliés d’y participer et d’être protégés. Pour être vraiment efficace, la défense antimissile doit être une entreprise commune ; c’est pourquoi la coopération au sein de l’Alliance ainsi qu’entre l’OTAN et ses partenaires (en particulier la Russie) est hautement souhaitable.

[page 19] Les menaces les plus probables pour les pays de l’Alliance dans les dix ans qui viennent sont de nature non conventionnelle. Trois d’entre elles se distinguent plus particulièrement : 1) une attaque de missile balistique (avec ou sans charge
nucléaire)(…)

[page 46] L’OTAN devrait inscrire la défense antimissile territoriale au nombre des missions essentielles de l’Alliance. À cet effet, elle devrait décider de développer son système de défense active multicouche contre les missiles balistiques de théâtre pour en faire le cœur de la capacité de commandement et de contrôle d’un système OTAN de défense antimissile territoriale.

En parlant du balistique comme étant « l’une des menaces les plus probables » et présentant la DAMB comme étant une « mission essentielle de l’Alliance », le groupe d’experts pousse donc dans le même sens que le Secrétaire général de l’OTAN. Ceci suscite plusieurs observations : [...]

Mardi 27 avril, le Ministre de la Défense Hervé Morin a été auditionné conjointement par les commissions de la défense nationale et des forces armées et des affaires étrangères de l’Assemblée nationale.

D’abord mentionnée par SD, puis aujourd’hui par Jean-Dominique Merchet, cette audition est particulièrement intéressante en ce qui concerne la défense anti-missiles balistiques (ou DAMB). Avant d’examiner son propos, un bref rappel de la position française sur le sujet semble nécessaire.

[...]