Ifri’s Security Studies Center has just published the issue #40 of its Proliferation Papers series entitled:

Dancing with the Bear: Managing Escalatation in a Conflict with Russia

The author, Forrest E. Morgan, is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct professor at the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. Before joining RAND in 2003, Dr. Morgan served a 27-year career in the U.S. Air Force.

He is the author and co-author of several books, including: Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment (RAND, 2010).

Summary of the article:

“Escalation”, the tendency of belligerents to increase the force or breadth of their attacks to gain advantage or avoid defeat, is not a new phenomenon. Systematic thought about how to manage it, however, did not crystallize until the Cold War and the invention of nuclear weapons. Given the limitations identified in these Cold War approaches to escalation and the profound changes that have affected the strategic environment, a new framework for thinking and managing escalation against nuclear adversaries is needed. It should lead to a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of escalation: its dynamics, forms, and the motives that drive it. This paper attempts to fill a gap in the current strategic literature, and explores the challenges that NATO would face in managing escalation in a military conflict with a major nuclear power such as the Russian Federation. Escalation management is about keeping wars limited. In a war against Russia, Western leaders would need to weigh their interests in the issue at stake and adjust their war aims and efforts accordingly. They could secure success only if it is defined and pursued in ways that ultimately allow for compromise and do not threaten the survival of the Russian state or its leaders.

Contents:

Introduction

Escalation Management during the Cold War

A New Approach to Escalation Management

Managing Escalation Risks in a Conflict with the Russian Federation

Conclusion

The paper is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!

Eurosatory’s Think Tank village organised Wednesday last week its second conference on the future of land warfare. A podcast is already available for you to listen to but first here are the broad lines of what was said in the three presentations.

Is counterinsurgency the Future of Land Warfare ? (Etienne de Durand):

• Warfare is a chameleon and its future evolution remains thus uncertain.
• From a French point of view, COIN (“counter-rebellion”) is but a specific sub-genre of irregular warfare and is mingled with peacekeeping and other tactical modes; therefore the main question decision makers should ask themselves is whether or not irregular operations will represent the future of land warfare.
• Large scale, high-intensity conflicts are unlikely in the present geostrategic context; the few conventional campaigns that are likely to happen will most likely take place at sea or in the air. Therefore, from an Army perspective, it makes sense to prepare mostly for irregular warfare.
• Irregular Warfare is more than just light infantry. It requires tactical mobility, precision fires, protection and more generally a lot of technology, as insurgents themselves also have access to modern technologies.
• At least for European armies, medium forces are likely to become the dominant model in terms of force structures.

A British point of view on hybrid warfare (Olivier Grouille):

• The British MOD and Army are at a strategic crossroad (overstretched financially, in the middle of a strategic defence review, an with new coalition government).
• A common understanding exists that a return to COIN as a mode of operations will have to take place within the British army.
• The UK needs to be prepared for both conventional and irregular warfare.
• Hybrid warfare will represent the future of many operations and state on state warfare itself could become hybrid.
• An adaptation of British troops will be necessary through education and training.
• The UK will not enter major operations alone in the future and cooperation will be necessary.

Insurgencies in tribal, clan societies (Jean-Jacques Patry):

• New wars of various intensities have emerged and have changed the security equation in the twenty-first century.
• Two types insurgencies should be distinguished: one that aims at gaining state power (classic Maoïst model) whilst the other tries to deny the (re)emergence of the state (typical of tribal societies like Afghanistan).
• Without a local state structure it is impossible to launch a successful COIN campaign. In other words, “winning hearts and minds” does not work when facing state-denying insurgencies.
• Powersharing is the solution to stabilise local actors. Once power is shared in a stable way it becomes possible to launch a COIN operation against the remaining insurgents.

If you wish to hear the full length recording of the conference please click below:

Etienne de Durand – Is COIN the Future of Land Warfare?:

Olivier Grouille – A British View on Hybrid Warfare:

Jean-Jacques Patry – Insurgencies in Tribal / Clan Societies: