Ifri’s Security Studies Center has just published the issue #40 of its Proliferation Papers series entitled:

Dancing with the Bear: Managing Escalatation in a Conflict with Russia

The author, Forrest E. Morgan, is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct professor at the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. Before joining RAND in 2003, Dr. Morgan served a 27-year career in the U.S. Air Force.

He is the author and co-author of several books, including: Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment (RAND, 2010).

Summary of the article:

“Escalation”, the tendency of belligerents to increase the force or breadth of their attacks to gain advantage or avoid defeat, is not a new phenomenon. Systematic thought about how to manage it, however, did not crystallize until the Cold War and the invention of nuclear weapons. Given the limitations identified in these Cold War approaches to escalation and the profound changes that have affected the strategic environment, a new framework for thinking and managing escalation against nuclear adversaries is needed. It should lead to a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of escalation: its dynamics, forms, and the motives that drive it. This paper attempts to fill a gap in the current strategic literature, and explores the challenges that NATO would face in managing escalation in a military conflict with a major nuclear power such as the Russian Federation. Escalation management is about keeping wars limited. In a war against Russia, Western leaders would need to weigh their interests in the issue at stake and adjust their war aims and efforts accordingly. They could secure success only if it is defined and pursued in ways that ultimately allow for compromise and do not threaten the survival of the Russian state or its leaders.

Contents:

Introduction

Escalation Management during the Cold War

A New Approach to Escalation Management

Managing Escalation Risks in a Conflict with the Russian Federation

Conclusion

The paper is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has recently published the issue #37 of its Proliferation Papers series entitled:

Russia’s Nuclear Forces: Between Disarmament and Modernization

The author, Pavel Podvig, is an independent analyst based in Geneva, where he runs his research project, “Russian Nuclear Forces.” He maintains a website, “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces,” which includes a blog at http://russianforces.org/blog/.

Summary:

Nuclear weapons have traditionally occupied an important place in Russia’s national security strategy. As Russia and the United States have been reducing their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, their relationship has undergone a complex transformation. Russia, however, still considers strategic balance with the United States to be an important element of national security. During the recent arms control negotiations with the United States, Russia strongly emphasized its interest in missile defense and conventional strategic launchers – issues that might directly affect its deterrent potential and discourage deep reductions. Still, the nuclear disarmament process could also change Russia’s security policy in a variety of ways, depending on how the subsequent dialogue addresses several key issues. After an overview of the current status of the Russian strategic nuclear forces and the strategic modernization program undertaken by Russia, this Proliferation Paper considers the role that missile defense and tactical nuclear weapons could play during the next round of nuclear arms control negotiations. Each of these problems presents a serious challenge. Nevertheless, this analysis suggests that recent progress in nuclear disarmament and the willingness of both countries to engage in a dialogue give the two countries an opportunity to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in their relationship.

Contents:

Introduction
Strategic Nuclear Forces
Missile Defense
Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Conclusion

The paper is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has recently published the issue #36 of its Proliferation Papers series:

Strategic Stability in the Cold War: Lessons for Continuing Challenges

The author is David S. Yost, a Professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

Abstract:

During the Cold War, the phrase “strategic stability” gained currency both as a foreign policy objective and as an apt way of describing the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union never actually went to war. To what extent did U.S. analytical models concerning “crisis stability,” “first-strike stability,” and “arms race stability” – and policies based on these models – contribute to the avoidance of war between the United States and the Soviet Union? This paper argues that, in light of Soviet and U.S. behavior at the time and in view of what has subsequently been learned about Soviet policies and decision-making, the proponents of these models have overestimated their utility. Today, the expression “strategic stability” is still widely used, for example in the U.S. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report. For this reason, and in the context of the forthcoming bilateral nuclear reductions, it may be useful to critically examine the cogency and relevance of these U.S. models from the Cold War period with a view to identifying lessons for current challenges.

Contents:

Introduction
U.S.-Soviet predominance and fear of nuclear war
American theories of stability during the Cold War
Lessons
Conclusion

The paper is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!