Ifri’s Security Studies Center has just published the issue #40 of its Proliferation Papers series entitled:

Dancing with the Bear: Managing Escalatation in a Conflict with Russia

The author, Forrest E. Morgan, is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct professor at the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. Before joining RAND in 2003, Dr. Morgan served a 27-year career in the U.S. Air Force.

He is the author and co-author of several books, including: Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment (RAND, 2010).

Summary of the article:

“Escalation”, the tendency of belligerents to increase the force or breadth of their attacks to gain advantage or avoid defeat, is not a new phenomenon. Systematic thought about how to manage it, however, did not crystallize until the Cold War and the invention of nuclear weapons. Given the limitations identified in these Cold War approaches to escalation and the profound changes that have affected the strategic environment, a new framework for thinking and managing escalation against nuclear adversaries is needed. It should lead to a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of escalation: its dynamics, forms, and the motives that drive it. This paper attempts to fill a gap in the current strategic literature, and explores the challenges that NATO would face in managing escalation in a military conflict with a major nuclear power such as the Russian Federation. Escalation management is about keeping wars limited. In a war against Russia, Western leaders would need to weigh their interests in the issue at stake and adjust their war aims and efforts accordingly. They could secure success only if it is defined and pursued in ways that ultimately allow for compromise and do not threaten the survival of the Russian state or its leaders.

Contents:

Introduction

Escalation Management during the Cold War

A New Approach to Escalation Management

Managing Escalation Risks in a Conflict with the Russian Federation

Conclusion

The paper is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has recently published two new Focus stratégique titled:

Focus stratégique no. 32, published on the occasion of the International Paris Air Show at Le Bourget, is titled « La guerre des hélicoptères. L’avenir de l’aéromobilité et de l’aérocombat ». This article was co-written by Etienne de Durand, Benoit Michel et Elie Tenenbaum.

Abstract:

Military helicopters have evolved into technologically sophisticated weapon systems. Originally designed to counter Soviet armor, attack helicopters now have to cope with a wide spectrum of threats, some of them bringing choppers back to their counterinsurgency roots. In this new context, direct “over the shoulder” support of ground forces has superseded airmobile maneuvers and autonomous helicopter-borne forces. Nonetheless, helicopters remain essential for their combat and tactical mobility roles. However, the high cost of these sophisticated platforms and reduced defense budgets call into question the ability to provide such tools. Accommodating strong demand in helicopters with present budget constraints requires the adaptation of fleets, since technological advances alone will not provide an answer to this problem. The time of homogenous fleets made up of same-generation, single-use platforms appears to be a thing of the past.

This article is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!

Etienne de Durand recently gave a speech before the Institute for International and European Affairs of Dublin, on “French Security and Defence Policy under Nicolas Sarkozy“.

The IIEA has been kind enough to put the video online on Youtube, so we’ve inserted it here. Since it lasts almost 45 minutes, here’s the outline of the speech:

• Introduction
• Where do we come from? Traditional French or Gaullist Policy (starts at 3’10″)
  • Origins
  • Defense policy during the 1990s
  • The Iraq war and afterwards
• Sarkozy’s New Look Policy, the FR-UK Deal and Its Implications (starts at 17’30″)
  • French security policy under Sarkozy
  • Sarkozy’s military policy and FR-UK deal
• Conclusion (starts at 41’38″)

We hope you’ll like the video. Don’t hesitate to leave comments here !

Ifri’s Defense Research Unit has just released a paper entitled:

France’s Return into NATO: French Military Culture and Strategic Identity in Question.

This article, written by Anne-Henry de Russé, examines the cultural, doctrinal and  operational consequences of France’s return into the military command of the Alliance.

The author starts off by reviewing the relations between France and NATO and the divergences that have led to France political “break-up” from NATO in 1966. He explains that the links between France and the Alliance were nonetheless maintained over time, and enhanced in the 1990s, resulting in France returning into the integrated structures of NATO.

In the second part of his study, de Russé develops three hypotheses regarding the possible consequences of said reintegration on the country’s military culture. The scenarios are the following:

• The return of France into NATO’s integrated structures remains first and foremost a political and institutional issue and has no impact on the country’s military culture.

• With the attribution of command positions to French staff, reintegration actually enriches French military culture and fosters the emergence of a new European strategic culture down the road.

• “Getting back into the NATO fold” engenders negative consequences for French military culture: it leads to cultural uniformity and strategic dependence as France adapts to NATO standards in terms of technology and doctrine.

The author concludes by saying that if France can earn much from full participation, it will nonetheless have to make significant efforts in terms of spending and human resources in order to be an influent Ally.

Your comments on this article are, of course, very welcome.