Ifri’s Security Studies Centre published in November 2010 a “Focus stratégique” entitled “The UN, a Clumsy Pygmalion: The Fragility of Nation-building in Timor”.

This slightly polemical article engendered quite a few reactions. Jean-Christian Cady, former Deputy special representative to the UN Secretary General in East Timor shared with us some very instructive comments on the actions of the UNTAET and, more broadly, on the UN’s practices in post-conflict missions.

These remarks shed light on the difficulties that the international community has faced in Timor, but also on the challenges which need to be tackled in almost every mission of nation-building. These would be, for instance, the multiplicity of languages and cultures and the uneven level of competence of UN personnel, the lack or even the absence of local human resources, the working and living conditions of the members of the missions, as well as the difficulty to cooperate with Bretton Woods institutions.

We highly recommend you to read these comments, available in English here.

Your own remarks are, of course, more than welcome!

Earlier this month, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism submitted a “compilation of good practices and institutional frameworks and measures that ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies while countering terrorism, including on their oversight” to the UN Human Rights Council.

Despite its cumbersome title, this annotated enumeration of 35 examples of good practice is certainly worth reading. It contains a comprehensive and well-structured account of what national intelligence laws and institutional frameworks for intelligence services could look like. This compilation is the outcome of a consultation process where Governments, experts and practitioners provided input in various different ways. I’ve been asked to give comments on an earlier draft and hope that the following general thought on this kind of best practice advocacy might be of interest to Ultima Ratio readers.

What exactly is the objective of this report? It is interesting how A/HRC/14/46 fails to provide a clear statement of purpose. In the introduction, the Special Rapporteur states that “it is not the purpose of this compilation to promulgate a set of normative standards that should apply at all times and in all parts of the world”. Fine, this should not be read as a blueprint for all nations to follow. But what then is its purpose?

Possibly, this was a contentious issue for the various parties that have contributed to the consultation process. National governments, academic experts, the UN bureaucracy and professional consultants are likely to pursue different and potentially conflicting objectives. Perhaps, then, the author felt compelled not to spell this out in further detail. If this was the case, it would illustrate one of the numerous problems with (or better: constraints of) such mandated research. All too often it is the logic of the consultation process rather than the logic of an empirical enquiry that is decisive in the end. This is all the more deplorable because the latter can generate custom-tailored and sustainable policy recommendations for intelligence governance, too. [...]