Ifri’s Security Studies Center has just published the issue #30 bis of its Focus Stratégique series entitled:

Digital Hoplites. Infantry Combat in the Information Age.

This article was written by Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Chareyron, a senior officer in the French Army,  who worked on detachment as a researcher at Ifri’s Defense Research Laboratory (LRD). He is a graduate of the Ecole Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr, the Cours Supérieur d’Etat-Major and the Ecole de Guerre (War College).

This text was previously published in French in April 2011.

Summary of the article:

FELIN, the world’s first “integrated soldier system”, will enter service in the French Army this year. Throughout history, infantrymen have sought to capitalize on technology while seeking the best compromise between three basic requirements: mobility, firepower and protection of combatants. As Western societies are sensitive to losses, the requirement for protection has become critical. Modern dismounted combat is thus characterized by the return of armor as well as by a greater emphasis on firepower. Furthermore, the emergence of a new generation of equipment allowing information technologies to be exploited at the level of the individual soldier is now making it necessary to address the issue of changes in infantry combat from the perspective of information superiority.

Contents:

Introduction

Innovation in the Infantry

The End of the Light Infantry

The Infantryman of the Future

Conclusion

Your comments are more than welcome!

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has just published the issue #21 bis of its Focus Stratégique series entitled:

Toward the End of Force Projection? II. Operational Responses and Political Perspectives

The author, Corentin Brustlein, is a research fellow in Ifri’s Defense Research Unit. He is also the deputy editor of Ifri’s Proliferation Papers, and blogs here at Ultima Ratio.

The article can be downloaded here.

This paper is the second part of a 2010 two-volume study on the antiaccess threat to Western armed forces. The translation of the first part, focusing antiaccess strategies and capabilities, was published back in July 2011 and can be downloaded here.

Abstract:

For more than a decade, US defense circles have been concerned about the emergence of capabilities and strategies, which, as they spread, risk imperiling the United States’ position in the world by their ability to disrupt or prevent force projection operations. Though most of the literature on such “anti-access” strategies focuses on the military aspects of the threat, this Focus stratégique – the second and last part of a two-part study – adopts a different perspective. Firstly, it considers the various means Western armed forces could rely on to confront anti-access strategies and conduct forcible entry operations, and assesses in particular the potential French and European contributions. Secondly, it argues that the problem of access cannot be studied in depth without taking into account its political dimension, which determines the operational freedom of action of both the interventionist powers and their adversaries. As was the case with the first part of the study, mostly centered on an analysis of current Iranian anti-access capabilities, this article is focused on examples taken from the Persian Gulf region.

And here’s this part’s table of contents:

Introduction

Western Responses to Anti-Access Capabilities

The Primacy of the Political Framework

Conclusion

Your comments are more than welcome!

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has recently published two new Focus stratégique titled:

Focus stratégique no. 32, published on the occasion of the International Paris Air Show at Le Bourget, is titled « La guerre des hélicoptères. L’avenir de l’aéromobilité et de l’aérocombat ». This article was co-written by Etienne de Durand, Benoit Michel et Elie Tenenbaum.

Abstract:

Military helicopters have evolved into technologically sophisticated weapon systems. Originally designed to counter Soviet armor, attack helicopters now have to cope with a wide spectrum of threats, some of them bringing choppers back to their counterinsurgency roots. In this new context, direct “over the shoulder” support of ground forces has superseded airmobile maneuvers and autonomous helicopter-borne forces. Nonetheless, helicopters remain essential for their combat and tactical mobility roles. However, the high cost of these sophisticated platforms and reduced defense budgets call into question the ability to provide such tools. Accommodating strong demand in helicopters with present budget constraints requires the adaptation of fleets, since technological advances alone will not provide an answer to this problem. The time of homogenous fleets made up of same-generation, single-use platforms appears to be a thing of the past.

This article is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!

Etienne de Durand recently gave a speech before the Institute for International and European Affairs of Dublin, on “French Security and Defence Policy under Nicolas Sarkozy“.

The IIEA has been kind enough to put the video online on Youtube, so we’ve inserted it here. Since it lasts almost 45 minutes, here’s the outline of the speech:

• Introduction
• Where do we come from? Traditional French or Gaullist Policy (starts at 3’10″)
  • Origins
  • Defense policy during the 1990s
  • The Iraq war and afterwards
• Sarkozy’s New Look Policy, the FR-UK Deal and Its Implications (starts at 17’30″)
  • French security policy under Sarkozy
  • Sarkozy’s military policy and FR-UK deal
• Conclusion (starts at 41’38″)

We hope you’ll like the video. Don’t hesitate to leave comments here !

The British quality newspaper The Guardian dedicated the week from 21^st to 26^th of March to… France. A very kind initiative, or so it first seemed when I heard this information at breakfast time on France Inter.

“New Europe” is a weekly series of articles dedicated to Britain’s continental neighbours, apparently motivated by the wish to build a bridge over the Channel. In the case of France, the initiative looked more like an exercise of autosuggestion… Falling in the trap of stereotypes, several articles try to convince the readers that the French are respectable people despite  their rudeness, strikes, pills, sexism, and even “failure to wash”.

However, one article starts with this assertion: “The French distrust us”. Distrust and dislike is indeed a historical feature of the relations between the peoples of France and Great Britain, explained by the two countries’ many shared (demographic, economic, geographic) characteristics as well as by their traditional divides on European integration and defence, attitudes towards the United States and foreign interventions – to name but just a few.

Following a rapprochement on European defence initiated 15 years ago by Britain and France at Saint-Malo,  the two countries have recently seemed to abandon their respective long-time bros (Germany on the one hand, America on the other) in favour of a bilateral long-term commitment that’s putting the rest of diplomatic alliances in the shade. Since November 2010, it has been repeated in the media, in political discourses as well as in the treaty, that France and Britain share a common (strategic) vision and that no situation is envisaged where the national interest of one party would be threatened without that of the other party being at stake. Trust and friendship thus seem to characterise high-level relations between the two countries. Still, the profound split between Paris and London over Iraq was less than a decade ago. At the time, the French Minister of foreign affairs (Dominique de Villepin) asserted:

“To those who choose the use of force and think that they can resolve the complexity of the world by a rapid and preventive action, we oppose a long-term determined action.”

In 2003, France was seating on the side of Germany, opposing the UK, the US, Spain and Italy, and advocated negotiations rather than military intervention. Now,what if France had opposed intervention in Libya in 2011? The circumstances of intervention in Iraq and in Libya are of course very different (be it only regarding the UN resolution), but if the present agreement between London and Paris on Libya has somewhat buried Iraq, a future divergence over foreign intervention could in turn bury Libya.  Today, the risk is limited. The Anglo-French relationship has not been one of fierce opposition since the end of Gaullism, and even less so since the end of Thatcherism. Plus, since Nicolas Sarkozy came to power, the French strategic posture towards the “Anglo-Saxon” world has shifted, the President being even called “the American” in the US. Indeed, he built a close relationship with George W. Bush, proceeded to the return of France in NATO’s integrated command and Wikileaks recently revealed that he disagreed with the French “excessive” position over Iraq.

Just as diplomatic proximity between Britain and France was getting more concrete, Paris and Berlin started to fall out of love. France and Germany used to be the drivers of the development of European security and defence tools and policies. But today, Germany is being criticised (including by France) for refusing to intervene in Libya, and even accused to “sink European defence”. Of course, Paris-Berlin is still the main economic axis in the European Union, and the ties between France and Germany are too strong to break over Libya, but criticism against Berlin’s refusal to use force is reaching new heights.

Looking at the dark side of things, France’s recent diplomatic reorientation highlights the fact that national interests, and the decisions made to preserve those interests, have a tendency to shift regularly. There is a presidential election in 2012 and Sarkozy will not necessarily be re-elected. Should the Left (or a Gaullist right-wing candidate) come to power, the country might undergo a new strategic shift that could damage the Anglo-French Alliance. In the long run, the newlyweds will have to share more than stereotypes, as they have embarked on a trip where they will be flying wing to wing for the next decades.

Ifri’s Defense Research Unit has just released a paper entitled:

France’s Return into NATO: French Military Culture and Strategic Identity in Question.

This article, written by Anne-Henry de Russé, examines the cultural, doctrinal and  operational consequences of France’s return into the military command of the Alliance.

The author starts off by reviewing the relations between France and NATO and the divergences that have led to France political “break-up” from NATO in 1966. He explains that the links between France and the Alliance were nonetheless maintained over time, and enhanced in the 1990s, resulting in France returning into the integrated structures of NATO.

In the second part of his study, de Russé develops three hypotheses regarding the possible consequences of said reintegration on the country’s military culture. The scenarios are the following:

• The return of France into NATO’s integrated structures remains first and foremost a political and institutional issue and has no impact on the country’s military culture.

• With the attribution of command positions to French staff, reintegration actually enriches French military culture and fosters the emergence of a new European strategic culture down the road.

• “Getting back into the NATO fold” engenders negative consequences for French military culture: it leads to cultural uniformity and strategic dependence as France adapts to NATO standards in terms of technology and doctrine.

The author concludes by saying that if France can earn much from full participation, it will nonetheless have to make significant efforts in terms of spending and human resources in order to be an influent Ally.

Your comments on this article are, of course, very welcome.

Etienne de Durand has just published in RUSI‘s Future Defence Review series an article in which he analyses the existent necessity and opportunities for France and Britain to develop defence co-operation. He argues that co-operation is not only advisable but also feasible, and would reinforce both the transatlantic links and the European defence project.

Abstract:

“France and the United Kingdom must exploit the present window of opportunity and substantially enhance defence co-operation. […] Operational demands and the consequences of the financial crisis mean that Britain and France can no longer preserve independent military capabilities that fully support their aspirations as global powers. If nothing is done, they will shrink beyond repair in volume and critical capabilities. Given extant capability gaps, traditional trade-offs will no longer suffice, and have actually already become counter-productive. […] Co-operation is now both rational, politically feasible and extremely urgent.”

“Entente or Oblivion : Prospects and Pitfalls of Franco-British Co-operation on Defence” is available for download here. Your comments are highly welcome !