Ifri’s Security Studies Center has recently published two new Focus stratégique titled:

Focus stratégique no. 32, published on the occasion of the International Paris Air Show at Le Bourget, is titled « La guerre des hélicoptères. L’avenir de l’aéromobilité et de l’aérocombat ». This article was co-written by Etienne de Durand, Benoit Michel et Elie Tenenbaum.

Abstract:

Military helicopters have evolved into technologically sophisticated weapon systems. Originally designed to counter Soviet armor, attack helicopters now have to cope with a wide spectrum of threats, some of them bringing choppers back to their counterinsurgency roots. In this new context, direct “over the shoulder” support of ground forces has superseded airmobile maneuvers and autonomous helicopter-borne forces. Nonetheless, helicopters remain essential for their combat and tactical mobility roles. However, the high cost of these sophisticated platforms and reduced defense budgets call into question the ability to provide such tools. Accommodating strong demand in helicopters with present budget constraints requires the adaptation of fleets, since technological advances alone will not provide an answer to this problem. The time of homogenous fleets made up of same-generation, single-use platforms appears to be a thing of the past.

This article is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!

Barack Obama accepted General McChrystal’s resignation as ISAF’s commander in chief last week and replaced him with his former superior, the now famous general Petraeus. This decision was taken only a few days after a Rolling Stone article, The Runaway General, was published. In this interview, McChrystal and, especially his staff, criticized and at times reviled civilian members of the Obama administration in charge of Afghanistan.

This raises questions: about Afghanistan, the Obama administration and the American decision-making process in general. But let’s start from the beginning, namely by bringing the article itself into question.

Strangely enough the downpour of comments and discussions this article by Michael Hastings has sparked, have largely failed to state the obvious: this piece is both unimpressive and biased. While it is Hastings’ right to strongly disapprove of the engagement in Afghanistan and of counterinsurgency in general, it is also the reader’s right to expect a well argued critique especially from someone who has spent much time around ‘Team America’. Yet apart from a few hints to the failure of the Marjah operation, corruption and also a couple of simplifications (for instance regarding the resignation of the German president in May), precious little is said about Afghanistan. By the end of the article it is rather clear that the author arrived in Kabul prejudiced against COIN and with an already made mind: “So far, counterinsurgency has succeeded only in creating a never-ending demand for the primary product supplied by the military: perpetual war.” His view on Petraeus’ nomination to McChrystal’s former post seems of the same stripe.

What’s more is the dishonest talent, with which Hastings manages to mix hasty analyses, juicy gossip and personal details (what’s the wife’s general got to do with this?). Amid this whirlwind, a carefully crafted picture seems to emerge: that of a bunch of officers both cynical and arrogant, opposed to civilian authorities – and in fact to all who do not share their views – and who seem more bent on denigrating their Beltway enemies than on running the war. The shady jokes and other offending comments, which led to McChrystal’s suspension, (“Biden? Did you say Bite me?”, Eikenberry’s ’treason’), are evidently highlighted throughout the article. As it happens, I have myself spent a month in Afghanistan, in July 2009, with general McChrystal and his staff: never have I heard any comments of the sort. I’m ready to believe that these were private chats and that the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan may have brought about a poisoned atmosphere, yet I can’t help but think that these comments were merely small talk, in a Parisian bar, that Hastings systematically took out of context to reinforce this impression of obnoxious feelings.

The general’s lack of judgment is clearly to be deplored: Why give an interview to a non-specialized journalist? Why on earth in Rolling Stone? Why did McChrystal and his staff allowed the paper to be published and why weren’t the facts contested? Amongst all hypotheses heard in the past week (disbelief, fatigue, professional fault, Machiavellic plan to be disassociated from a predictable failure in Afghanistan….) the most plausible one seems to be a basic disregard of what supposed to remain off the record, and a paper already circulated anyways.

In books to come specialized journalists and historians will shed light on this affair – Tom Ricks must already be at work on Fiasco 2. Yet this pathetic situation calls for a deeper analysis of its consequences on the mission in Afghanistan and civil-military relations in the US. [...]

Eurosatory’s Think Tank village organised Wednesday last week its second conference on the future of land warfare. A podcast is already available for you to listen to but first here are the broad lines of what was said in the three presentations.

Is counterinsurgency the Future of Land Warfare ? (Etienne de Durand):

• Warfare is a chameleon and its future evolution remains thus uncertain.
• From a French point of view, COIN (“counter-rebellion”) is but a specific sub-genre of irregular warfare and is mingled with peacekeeping and other tactical modes; therefore the main question decision makers should ask themselves is whether or not irregular operations will represent the future of land warfare.
• Large scale, high-intensity conflicts are unlikely in the present geostrategic context; the few conventional campaigns that are likely to happen will most likely take place at sea or in the air. Therefore, from an Army perspective, it makes sense to prepare mostly for irregular warfare.
• Irregular Warfare is more than just light infantry. It requires tactical mobility, precision fires, protection and more generally a lot of technology, as insurgents themselves also have access to modern technologies.
• At least for European armies, medium forces are likely to become the dominant model in terms of force structures.

A British point of view on hybrid warfare (Olivier Grouille):

• The British MOD and Army are at a strategic crossroad (overstretched financially, in the middle of a strategic defence review, an with new coalition government).
• A common understanding exists that a return to COIN as a mode of operations will have to take place within the British army.
• The UK needs to be prepared for both conventional and irregular warfare.
• Hybrid warfare will represent the future of many operations and state on state warfare itself could become hybrid.
• An adaptation of British troops will be necessary through education and training.
• The UK will not enter major operations alone in the future and cooperation will be necessary.

Insurgencies in tribal, clan societies (Jean-Jacques Patry):

• New wars of various intensities have emerged and have changed the security equation in the twenty-first century.
• Two types insurgencies should be distinguished: one that aims at gaining state power (classic Maoïst model) whilst the other tries to deny the (re)emergence of the state (typical of tribal societies like Afghanistan).
• Without a local state structure it is impossible to launch a successful COIN campaign. In other words, “winning hearts and minds” does not work when facing state-denying insurgencies.
• Powersharing is the solution to stabilise local actors. Once power is shared in a stable way it becomes possible to launch a COIN operation against the remaining insurgents.

If you wish to hear the full length recording of the conference please click below:

Etienne de Durand – Is COIN the Future of Land Warfare?:

Olivier Grouille – A British View on Hybrid Warfare:

Jean-Jacques Patry – Insurgencies in Tribal / Clan Societies: