Ifri’s Security Studies Center has just published the issue #39 of its Proliferation Papers series entitled:

In Defense of Deterrence: the Relevance, Morality and Cost-Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons

The author, Dr. Bruno Tertrais is a senior research fellow at the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS) and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Between 2007 and 2008 he was a member of the French presidential commission on the White Paper on Defense and Security, as well as a member of the French ministerial commission on the White Paper on Foreign and European Policy.

In 2010, he was awarded the Vauban Prize for his entire work. He is the author, among many other publications, of “War Without End” (New York: the New Press, 2005).

Summary of the article:

Since 1945, nuclear deterrence has frequently been the target of continuous criticism on strategic, legal and moral grounds. In the past five years, however, the renewed debate on nuclear disarmament has been accompanied by an increase in such criticism. The alleged limited value of nuclear weapons vis-à-vis proliferation and terrorism, and the existence of alternatives such as high-precision conventional means and missile defense, have strengthened some of these arguments against nuclear deterrence. This Proliferation Paper attempts to offer a proper defense of nuclear deterrence, by reaffirming its validity as a war-prevention mechanism and by responding to the main criticisms that it faces. Finally, it reasserts the fact that maintaining and nurturing nuclear deterrence should remain a primary objective of Western governments.

Contents:

Introduction

Nuclear Deterrence Works

Nuclear Deterrence is Neither Immoral nor Illegal

Nuclear Deterrence is Cost-Effective

Nuclear Deterrence Remains Fully Relevant

The paper is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has just published the issue #21 bis of its Focus Stratégique series entitled:

Toward the End of Force Projection? II. Operational Responses and Political Perspectives

The author, Corentin Brustlein, is a research fellow in Ifri’s Defense Research Unit. He is also the deputy editor of Ifri’s Proliferation Papers, and blogs here at Ultima Ratio.

The article can be downloaded here.

This paper is the second part of a 2010 two-volume study on the antiaccess threat to Western armed forces. The translation of the first part, focusing antiaccess strategies and capabilities, was published back in July 2011 and can be downloaded here.

Abstract:

For more than a decade, US defense circles have been concerned about the emergence of capabilities and strategies, which, as they spread, risk imperiling the United States’ position in the world by their ability to disrupt or prevent force projection operations. Though most of the literature on such “anti-access” strategies focuses on the military aspects of the threat, this Focus stratégique – the second and last part of a two-part study – adopts a different perspective. Firstly, it considers the various means Western armed forces could rely on to confront anti-access strategies and conduct forcible entry operations, and assesses in particular the potential French and European contributions. Secondly, it argues that the problem of access cannot be studied in depth without taking into account its political dimension, which determines the operational freedom of action of both the interventionist powers and their adversaries. As was the case with the first part of the study, mostly centered on an analysis of current Iranian anti-access capabilities, this article is focused on examples taken from the Persian Gulf region.

And here’s this part’s table of contents:

Introduction

Western Responses to Anti-Access Capabilities

The Primacy of the Political Framework

Conclusion

Your comments are more than welcome!

Sometimes you wish you never accepted to review a friend’s book/article : you lack the time to read the document, and once you finally find a few minutes/hours to discover it, it proves disappointing (and it’s pretty hard to find an easy way to say that). Some other times, fortunately, it’s the opposite: you get just what you were looking for (but still have to find the right way to say it, not to look like you’re congratulating a friend for being a friend). I’m glad to write from the start that this monograph clearly belongs to the second group.

Of course, it cannot be said to be a huge surprise when someone studying both military innovation and nuclear weapons policies (curiously enough, not the two of them together) finds interest in a paper on the innovation processes that gave birth to US Navy’s ballistic missiles. Still, disappointment was a real possibility, either due to a lack of empirical research, superficial treatment of the issue, or lack of theorization. Again, you’ll find no such thing here.

In his monograph, Sébastien Miraglia, a researcher at the Oslo-based Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies (IFS), reviews the development of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program from its creation back in the 1950s, to the Trident II D5, which currently equips US Navy’s Ohio-class SSBNs (as well as Royal Navy’s 4 Vanguard-class subs). Sébastien’s argument is that initial orientations taken by the Navy’s office in charge, the Strategic Project Office (SPO) weighed on its future choices and constrained its ability to respond optimally to external stimuli for change, such as new nuclear policies. This, in turn, created serious risks of disconnection between requirements identified at the policy level and available capabilities. For instance, following the deployment of the Soviet Galosh anti-ballistic missile defense system, SPO chose to respond not through the development of penetration aids – a path taken by the USAF for its Minuteman II ICBMs – but by putting multiple, smaller warheads on top of US SLBMs (MIRVing, for those who might not be familiar with the issue). It didn’t follow that path because MIRVing seemed to be the optimal way to deal with the threat from these rudimentary defenses. It took a path that would allow it to make good use of previous R&D on MIRVing, avoid entry costs associated with such developments as penetration aids, all the while fulfilling what it considered its core missions: saturate defenses and strike “soft” targets such as urban areas.

As one may guess, the paper rests heavily on concepts and approaches drawn from historical institutionalism and sociology of organizations. What one may not guess is that in addition to using classics such as MacKenzie’s Inventing Accuracy, Sébastien made extensive use of historical, unpublished material/archives from the SPO and its successor, various memoranda and transcripts of interviews of individuals directly involved in the program.

The result is a highly readable, rigorous and insightful research, as well as a great opportunity to discover the inside story – or close to – of the program and to understand how technical and operational dilemmas were solved. A great read for anyone interested military innovation, technology development and US nuclear history.

The study is available online for free (here) but you may as well consider buying a softcover copy as the format is great (much better, for example, than SSI monographs). Also, take some time to visit the IFS website and the other one dedicated to their publications, as you’ll find lots of interesting stuff here (by the way, people at IFS are the ones you should thank for last year’s amazing special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies on the Information Revolution in Military Affairs).

Gratulerer, Sébastien !

Sébastien Miraglia, Nuclear strategy and the development of military technology. The case of the Fleet Ballistic Missile programme, Defence and Security Studies – Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (Institutt for Forsvarsstudier), 2/2010, 124 p. PDF or paper (free / 100 NOK or approx. ~USD 16.00)

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has recently published the issue #37 of its Proliferation Papers series entitled:

Russia’s Nuclear Forces: Between Disarmament and Modernization

The author, Pavel Podvig, is an independent analyst based in Geneva, where he runs his research project, “Russian Nuclear Forces.” He maintains a website, “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces,” which includes a blog at http://russianforces.org/blog/.

Summary:

Nuclear weapons have traditionally occupied an important place in Russia’s national security strategy. As Russia and the United States have been reducing their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, their relationship has undergone a complex transformation. Russia, however, still considers strategic balance with the United States to be an important element of national security. During the recent arms control negotiations with the United States, Russia strongly emphasized its interest in missile defense and conventional strategic launchers – issues that might directly affect its deterrent potential and discourage deep reductions. Still, the nuclear disarmament process could also change Russia’s security policy in a variety of ways, depending on how the subsequent dialogue addresses several key issues. After an overview of the current status of the Russian strategic nuclear forces and the strategic modernization program undertaken by Russia, this Proliferation Paper considers the role that missile defense and tactical nuclear weapons could play during the next round of nuclear arms control negotiations. Each of these problems presents a serious challenge. Nevertheless, this analysis suggests that recent progress in nuclear disarmament and the willingness of both countries to engage in a dialogue give the two countries an opportunity to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in their relationship.

Contents:

Introduction
Strategic Nuclear Forces
Missile Defense
Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Conclusion

The paper is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has recently published the issue #36 of its Proliferation Papers series:

Strategic Stability in the Cold War: Lessons for Continuing Challenges

The author is David S. Yost, a Professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

Abstract:

During the Cold War, the phrase “strategic stability” gained currency both as a foreign policy objective and as an apt way of describing the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union never actually went to war. To what extent did U.S. analytical models concerning “crisis stability,” “first-strike stability,” and “arms race stability” – and policies based on these models – contribute to the avoidance of war between the United States and the Soviet Union? This paper argues that, in light of Soviet and U.S. behavior at the time and in view of what has subsequently been learned about Soviet policies and decision-making, the proponents of these models have overestimated their utility. Today, the expression “strategic stability” is still widely used, for example in the U.S. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report. For this reason, and in the context of the forthcoming bilateral nuclear reductions, it may be useful to critically examine the cogency and relevance of these U.S. models from the Cold War period with a view to identifying lessons for current challenges.

Contents:

Introduction
U.S.-Soviet predominance and fear of nuclear war
American theories of stability during the Cold War
Lessons
Conclusion

The paper is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!