Ifri’s Security Studies Center has just published the issue #30 bis of its Focus Stratégique series entitled:

Digital Hoplites. Infantry Combat in the Information Age.

This article was written by Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Chareyron, a senior officer in the French Army,  who worked on detachment as a researcher at Ifri’s Defense Research Laboratory (LRD). He is a graduate of the Ecole Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr, the Cours Supérieur d’Etat-Major and the Ecole de Guerre (War College).

This text was previously published in French in April 2011.

Summary of the article:

FELIN, the world’s first “integrated soldier system”, will enter service in the French Army this year. Throughout history, infantrymen have sought to capitalize on technology while seeking the best compromise between three basic requirements: mobility, firepower and protection of combatants. As Western societies are sensitive to losses, the requirement for protection has become critical. Modern dismounted combat is thus characterized by the return of armor as well as by a greater emphasis on firepower. Furthermore, the emergence of a new generation of equipment allowing information technologies to be exploited at the level of the individual soldier is now making it necessary to address the issue of changes in infantry combat from the perspective of information superiority.

Contents:

Introduction

Innovation in the Infantry

The End of the Light Infantry

The Infantryman of the Future

Conclusion

Your comments are more than welcome!

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has recently published two new Focus stratégique titled:

Focus stratégique no. 32, published on the occasion of the International Paris Air Show at Le Bourget, is titled « La guerre des hélicoptères. L’avenir de l’aéromobilité et de l’aérocombat ». This article was co-written by Etienne de Durand, Benoit Michel et Elie Tenenbaum.

Abstract:

Military helicopters have evolved into technologically sophisticated weapon systems. Originally designed to counter Soviet armor, attack helicopters now have to cope with a wide spectrum of threats, some of them bringing choppers back to their counterinsurgency roots. In this new context, direct “over the shoulder” support of ground forces has superseded airmobile maneuvers and autonomous helicopter-borne forces. Nonetheless, helicopters remain essential for their combat and tactical mobility roles. However, the high cost of these sophisticated platforms and reduced defense budgets call into question the ability to provide such tools. Accommodating strong demand in helicopters with present budget constraints requires the adaptation of fleets, since technological advances alone will not provide an answer to this problem. The time of homogenous fleets made up of same-generation, single-use platforms appears to be a thing of the past.

This article is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!

Barack Obama accepted General McChrystal’s resignation as ISAF’s commander in chief last week and replaced him with his former superior, the now famous general Petraeus. This decision was taken only a few days after a Rolling Stone article, The Runaway General, was published. In this interview, McChrystal and, especially his staff, criticized and at times reviled civilian members of the Obama administration in charge of Afghanistan.

This raises questions: about Afghanistan, the Obama administration and the American decision-making process in general. But let’s start from the beginning, namely by bringing the article itself into question.

Strangely enough the downpour of comments and discussions this article by Michael Hastings has sparked, have largely failed to state the obvious: this piece is both unimpressive and biased. While it is Hastings’ right to strongly disapprove of the engagement in Afghanistan and of counterinsurgency in general, it is also the reader’s right to expect a well argued critique especially from someone who has spent much time around ‘Team America’. Yet apart from a few hints to the failure of the Marjah operation, corruption and also a couple of simplifications (for instance regarding the resignation of the German president in May), precious little is said about Afghanistan. By the end of the article it is rather clear that the author arrived in Kabul prejudiced against COIN and with an already made mind: “So far, counterinsurgency has succeeded only in creating a never-ending demand for the primary product supplied by the military: perpetual war.” His view on Petraeus’ nomination to McChrystal’s former post seems of the same stripe.

What’s more is the dishonest talent, with which Hastings manages to mix hasty analyses, juicy gossip and personal details (what’s the wife’s general got to do with this?). Amid this whirlwind, a carefully crafted picture seems to emerge: that of a bunch of officers both cynical and arrogant, opposed to civilian authorities – and in fact to all who do not share their views – and who seem more bent on denigrating their Beltway enemies than on running the war. The shady jokes and other offending comments, which led to McChrystal’s suspension, (“Biden? Did you say Bite me?”, Eikenberry’s ’treason’), are evidently highlighted throughout the article. As it happens, I have myself spent a month in Afghanistan, in July 2009, with general McChrystal and his staff: never have I heard any comments of the sort. I’m ready to believe that these were private chats and that the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan may have brought about a poisoned atmosphere, yet I can’t help but think that these comments were merely small talk, in a Parisian bar, that Hastings systematically took out of context to reinforce this impression of obnoxious feelings.

The general’s lack of judgment is clearly to be deplored: Why give an interview to a non-specialized journalist? Why on earth in Rolling Stone? Why did McChrystal and his staff allowed the paper to be published and why weren’t the facts contested? Amongst all hypotheses heard in the past week (disbelief, fatigue, professional fault, Machiavellic plan to be disassociated from a predictable failure in Afghanistan….) the most plausible one seems to be a basic disregard of what supposed to remain off the record, and a paper already circulated anyways.

In books to come specialized journalists and historians will shed light on this affair – Tom Ricks must already be at work on Fiasco 2. Yet this pathetic situation calls for a deeper analysis of its consequences on the mission in Afghanistan and civil-military relations in the US. [...]