Ifri’s Security Studies Center has just published the issue #40 of its Proliferation Papers series entitled:

Dancing with the Bear: Managing Escalatation in a Conflict with Russia

The author, Forrest E. Morgan, is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct professor at the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. Before joining RAND in 2003, Dr. Morgan served a 27-year career in the U.S. Air Force.

He is the author and co-author of several books, including: Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment (RAND, 2010).

Summary of the article:

“Escalation”, the tendency of belligerents to increase the force or breadth of their attacks to gain advantage or avoid defeat, is not a new phenomenon. Systematic thought about how to manage it, however, did not crystallize until the Cold War and the invention of nuclear weapons. Given the limitations identified in these Cold War approaches to escalation and the profound changes that have affected the strategic environment, a new framework for thinking and managing escalation against nuclear adversaries is needed. It should lead to a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of escalation: its dynamics, forms, and the motives that drive it. This paper attempts to fill a gap in the current strategic literature, and explores the challenges that NATO would face in managing escalation in a military conflict with a major nuclear power such as the Russian Federation. Escalation management is about keeping wars limited. In a war against Russia, Western leaders would need to weigh their interests in the issue at stake and adjust their war aims and efforts accordingly. They could secure success only if it is defined and pursued in ways that ultimately allow for compromise and do not threaten the survival of the Russian state or its leaders.

Contents:

Introduction

Escalation Management during the Cold War

A New Approach to Escalation Management

Managing Escalation Risks in a Conflict with the Russian Federation

Conclusion

The paper is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has just published the issue #32 bis of its Focus Stratégique series entitled:

Helicopter Warfare. The Future of Airmobility and Rotary Wing Combat

The authors:

A specialist in strategic and military issues, Etienne de Durand is the Director of the CES and LRD units at the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri).

A senior officer and a specialist in airborne techniques, Major Benoît Michel is on a special research assignment at the Ifri LRD.

A qualified history teacher, Elie Tenenbaum is a research assistant at the LRD.

This text was previously published in French as “La guerre des hélicoptères. L’avenir de l’aéromobilité et de l’aérocombat”, Focus stratégique, no. 32, June 2011.

Summary of the article:

Military helicopters have evolved into technologically sophisticated weapon systems. Originally designed to counter Soviet armor, attack helicopters now have to cope with a wide spectrum of threats, some of them bringing them back to their counterinsurgency roots. In this new context, direct fire support of ground forces has superseded airmobile maneuvers and autonomous helicopter forces. Nonetheless, helicopters remain essential for their combat and tactical mobility roles. However, the high cost of these sophisticated platforms and major cuts in defense budgets call into question the ability to provide such tools. Accommodating strong demand in helicopters with present budget constraints requires the adaptation of fleets, since technological advances alone will not provide an answer to this problem. The time of homogenous fleets made up of same-generation, single-use platforms, appears to belong to the past.

Contents:

Introduction

From Support to Maneuver: the Helicopter Century

Capacity Crisis and Doctrinal Questions

Contrasting Future Perspectives

Conclusion

Your comments are more than welcome!

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has just published the issue #30 bis of its Focus Stratégique series entitled:

Digital Hoplites. Infantry Combat in the Information Age.

This article was written by Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Chareyron, a senior officer in the French Army,  who worked on detachment as a researcher at Ifri’s Defense Research Laboratory (LRD). He is a graduate of the Ecole Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr, the Cours Supérieur d’Etat-Major and the Ecole de Guerre (War College).

This text was previously published in French in April 2011.

Summary of the article:

FELIN, the world’s first “integrated soldier system”, will enter service in the French Army this year. Throughout history, infantrymen have sought to capitalize on technology while seeking the best compromise between three basic requirements: mobility, firepower and protection of combatants. As Western societies are sensitive to losses, the requirement for protection has become critical. Modern dismounted combat is thus characterized by the return of armor as well as by a greater emphasis on firepower. Furthermore, the emergence of a new generation of equipment allowing information technologies to be exploited at the level of the individual soldier is now making it necessary to address the issue of changes in infantry combat from the perspective of information superiority.

Contents:

Introduction

Innovation in the Infantry

The End of the Light Infantry

The Infantryman of the Future

Conclusion

Your comments are more than welcome!

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has just published the issue #39 of its Proliferation Papers series entitled:

In Defense of Deterrence: the Relevance, Morality and Cost-Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons

The author, Dr. Bruno Tertrais is a senior research fellow at the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS) and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Between 2007 and 2008 he was a member of the French presidential commission on the White Paper on Defense and Security, as well as a member of the French ministerial commission on the White Paper on Foreign and European Policy.

In 2010, he was awarded the Vauban Prize for his entire work. He is the author, among many other publications, of “War Without End” (New York: the New Press, 2005).

Summary of the article:

Since 1945, nuclear deterrence has frequently been the target of continuous criticism on strategic, legal and moral grounds. In the past five years, however, the renewed debate on nuclear disarmament has been accompanied by an increase in such criticism. The alleged limited value of nuclear weapons vis-à-vis proliferation and terrorism, and the existence of alternatives such as high-precision conventional means and missile defense, have strengthened some of these arguments against nuclear deterrence. This Proliferation Paper attempts to offer a proper defense of nuclear deterrence, by reaffirming its validity as a war-prevention mechanism and by responding to the main criticisms that it faces. Finally, it reasserts the fact that maintaining and nurturing nuclear deterrence should remain a primary objective of Western governments.

Contents:

Introduction

Nuclear Deterrence Works

Nuclear Deterrence is Neither Immoral nor Illegal

Nuclear Deterrence is Cost-Effective

Nuclear Deterrence Remains Fully Relevant

The paper is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has just published the issue #21 bis of its Focus Stratégique series entitled:

Toward the End of Force Projection? II. Operational Responses and Political Perspectives

The author, Corentin Brustlein, is a research fellow in Ifri’s Defense Research Unit. He is also the deputy editor of Ifri’s Proliferation Papers, and blogs here at Ultima Ratio.

The article can be downloaded here.

This paper is the second part of a 2010 two-volume study on the antiaccess threat to Western armed forces. The translation of the first part, focusing antiaccess strategies and capabilities, was published back in July 2011 and can be downloaded here.

Abstract:

For more than a decade, US defense circles have been concerned about the emergence of capabilities and strategies, which, as they spread, risk imperiling the United States’ position in the world by their ability to disrupt or prevent force projection operations. Though most of the literature on such “anti-access” strategies focuses on the military aspects of the threat, this Focus stratégique – the second and last part of a two-part study – adopts a different perspective. Firstly, it considers the various means Western armed forces could rely on to confront anti-access strategies and conduct forcible entry operations, and assesses in particular the potential French and European contributions. Secondly, it argues that the problem of access cannot be studied in depth without taking into account its political dimension, which determines the operational freedom of action of both the interventionist powers and their adversaries. As was the case with the first part of the study, mostly centered on an analysis of current Iranian anti-access capabilities, this article is focused on examples taken from the Persian Gulf region.

And here’s this part’s table of contents:

Introduction

Western Responses to Anti-Access Capabilities

The Primacy of the Political Framework

Conclusion

Your comments are more than welcome!

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has recently published the issue #38 of its Proliferation Papers series entitled:

Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons Learned

The author, Keith A. Hansen is a consulting professor of international relations at Stanford University and Sierra Nevada College. As an expert on strategic nuclear force issues, he served for over three decades with the US Government in both military and civilian assignments.

Summary:

Intelligence agencies play a fundamental role in the prevention of nuclear proliferation, as they help to understand other countries’ intentions and assess their technical capabilities and the nature of their nuclear activities. The challenges in this area remain, however, formidable. Past experiences and the discoveries of Iraq’s WMD programs, of North Korean nuclear weapon program, and of Iranian activities, have put into question the ability of intelligence to monitor small, clandestine proliferation activities from either states or non-state entities. This Proliferation Paper analyzes the complex challenges intelligence faces and the various roles it plays in supporting national and international nuclear non-proliferation efforts, and reviews its track record.

The paper is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has recently published the issue #37 of its Proliferation Papers series entitled:

Russia’s Nuclear Forces: Between Disarmament and Modernization

The author, Pavel Podvig, is an independent analyst based in Geneva, where he runs his research project, “Russian Nuclear Forces.” He maintains a website, “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces,” which includes a blog at http://russianforces.org/blog/.

Summary:

Nuclear weapons have traditionally occupied an important place in Russia’s national security strategy. As Russia and the United States have been reducing their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, their relationship has undergone a complex transformation. Russia, however, still considers strategic balance with the United States to be an important element of national security. During the recent arms control negotiations with the United States, Russia strongly emphasized its interest in missile defense and conventional strategic launchers – issues that might directly affect its deterrent potential and discourage deep reductions. Still, the nuclear disarmament process could also change Russia’s security policy in a variety of ways, depending on how the subsequent dialogue addresses several key issues. After an overview of the current status of the Russian strategic nuclear forces and the strategic modernization program undertaken by Russia, this Proliferation Paper considers the role that missile defense and tactical nuclear weapons could play during the next round of nuclear arms control negotiations. Each of these problems presents a serious challenge. Nevertheless, this analysis suggests that recent progress in nuclear disarmament and the willingness of both countries to engage in a dialogue give the two countries an opportunity to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in their relationship.

Contents:

Introduction
Strategic Nuclear Forces
Missile Defense
Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Conclusion

The paper is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!

Ifri’s Security Studies Center has recently published two new Focus stratégique titled:

Focus stratégique no. 32, published on the occasion of the International Paris Air Show at Le Bourget, is titled « La guerre des hélicoptères. L’avenir de l’aéromobilité et de l’aérocombat ». This article was co-written by Etienne de Durand, Benoit Michel et Elie Tenenbaum.

Abstract:

Military helicopters have evolved into technologically sophisticated weapon systems. Originally designed to counter Soviet armor, attack helicopters now have to cope with a wide spectrum of threats, some of them bringing choppers back to their counterinsurgency roots. In this new context, direct “over the shoulder” support of ground forces has superseded airmobile maneuvers and autonomous helicopter-borne forces. Nonetheless, helicopters remain essential for their combat and tactical mobility roles. However, the high cost of these sophisticated platforms and reduced defense budgets call into question the ability to provide such tools. Accommodating strong demand in helicopters with present budget constraints requires the adaptation of fleets, since technological advances alone will not provide an answer to this problem. The time of homogenous fleets made up of same-generation, single-use platforms appears to be a thing of the past.

This article is available for download here.

Your comments are more than welcome!

Robert Jervis. 2010. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 248 pages).

When it comes to assessing the strength, the intention and the common sense of a foreign regime, why do intelligence analysts often get things quite so wrong and what can be done to reduce the likelihood of future intelligence failures? These are intriguing albeit not exactly novel questions. Next to official “postmortems” (p. 123) on intelligence failures (i.e. reports by judicial inquiries and oversight commissions), one also finds a growing number of intelligence scholars wrestling with the subject. Still, Robert Jervis, a long-time expert on deception in international relations and occasional CIA contractor, is uniquely positioned to expand on the practice, the challenges and the limitations to foreign intelligence analysis and his latest book, Why intelligence fails, does indeed stand out.

The author brings his privileged access to the intelligence community and his long-time experience with research design to bear on two remarkable case studies: the first on the inability of the U.S. intelligence community to predict the onslaught of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the second on its flawed assessment regarding Saddam Hussein’s WMD programme. This adds much-needed texture to the arcane life-world of foreign intelligence. For example, in the Iraqi WMD intelligence failure case, Jervis reviews the entire intelligence production process from the perspective of the individual analysts who were tasked to make sense of conflicting reports on Saddam’s capabilities and intentions. We learn about the kind of information that they had to work with and the foregone opportunities to apply basic social science research methods to make their underlying assumptions more explicit and to embrace alternative explanations for their findings. We also learn about the analysts, their training, their resources, their work routines as well as the oftentimes difficult division of labour and information flows amongst different agencies as well as the taxing interactions with the various ‘clients’ in Washington. The constant referrals to the concrete case at hand makes his venture into the labyrinth of U.S. intelligence readable and provides authority to his recommendations for intelligence reform. Jervis rightly cautions against undue expectations on the intelligence services (arguing convincingly that excellent analysts could still have drawn the wrong conclusions) and his rebuttals of overzealous or merely cosmetic reform proposals follow logically from the empirical chapters.

It becomes more problematic, in my view, when Jervis uses his findings to reject the widespread notion that the intelligence community bowed to political pressure from the Bush administration. Jervis does not deny that the Bush administration pressured the intelligence services to produce suitable outputs for its predetermined decision to invade Iraq but he finds no reason to believe that the intelligence services succumbed to this pressure. This is, of course, quite a position to defend and the author is notably pleased to be at odds with mainstream analysis, which “so comforts to common sense that it has been a barrier to more careful thought” (p. 131). Yet it is here where Jervis fails to adhere to his own standards: Why must his well-argued position that the intelligence community failed to make sense of social science research methods be necessarily at odds with the finding that the intelligence services were also captured by an extremely hawkish administration? Jervis’ does not give much thought to this and his eagerness to rule out the latter is not in keeping with his basic advice for future generations of intelligence analysts.

(For a French version of this text, see: Poltique Etrangère, Vol. 76, Nr. 2.)

Etienne de Durand recently gave a speech before the Institute for International and European Affairs of Dublin, on “French Security and Defence Policy under Nicolas Sarkozy“.

The IIEA has been kind enough to put the video online on Youtube, so we’ve inserted it here. Since it lasts almost 45 minutes, here’s the outline of the speech:

• Introduction
• Where do we come from? Traditional French or Gaullist Policy (starts at 3’10″)
  • Origins
  • Defense policy during the 1990s
  • The Iraq war and afterwards
• Sarkozy’s New Look Policy, the FR-UK Deal and Its Implications (starts at 17’30″)
  • French security policy under Sarkozy
  • Sarkozy’s military policy and FR-UK deal
• Conclusion (starts at 41’38″)

We hope you’ll like the video. Don’t hesitate to leave comments here !