Yet another attack was perpetrated on Sunday against a church in the Nigerian city of Jos by the group Boko Haram. In November last year, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee had issued a report stating that this Muslim sect, which has been carrying out increasingly violent attacks in Nigeria in the past months, was “an emerging threat to the U.S. homeland.” The organisation, whose name translates as “Western education is a sin” in the Haoussa language, is a Salafist jihadist group based in northeast Nigeria. Seeking to establish Sharia law across a country divided between a mainly Muslim north and mostly Christian south, it has killed 935 people since 2009 through bombings and assassinations of Christians living in the north of the country. Last August, it moved up a notch when it managed to attract worldwide attention by attacking U.N. headquarters in Abuja, killing 25 people and injuring more than 80. But has Boko Haram really become the “next battalion” of global jihadists?

Whether this terrorist organisation is linked to al-Qaeda or not is a question which has been on many experts’ minds during the past months. A UN Security Council Report stated that Boko Haram members had been arrested last year as they were travelling to Mali, in possession of documents on the manufacturing of explosives and details of AQIM members. More generally, some officials claim that the similarity in the frequency and ingenuity of Boko Haram’s and al-Qaeda’s methods suggests there is some form of cooperation with international terrorist networks: Algeria’s branch of al-Qaeda or Somalia’s Shebabs, even though the latter hypothesis is highly questionable. In addition to these assumptions, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, determined to stand as a front-line ally in the West’s war on terror, has kept such suspicions going by referring to the group as a “terrorist organisation with global ambitions.”

But in spite of Boko Haram’s attempts to recall, notably in their YouTube videos, the style of al-Qaeda, at the end of the day it remains firmly focused on domestic Nigerian grievances. Joe Brock explains that “[the group’s] anger is directed not at America or Europe but at Nigeria’s elites: at their perceived arrogance, their failure to deliver services, and the brutality of their security forces.” Even though Boko Haram officially covets the general implementation of Sharia law in Nigeria, and even if, as the late Samuel P. Huntington would argue, religious and cultural differences are enough to trigger a conflict, a careful analysis of the group demonstrates that its resentment already existed decades ago and does not have everything to do with a broader Islamist programme.

There is, indeed, a cocktail of explanations for the ongoing violence in Nigeria. First of all, in spite of extensive natural resources, Nigeria ranks among the most unequal countries in the world. Although it cannot be denied that there is a radicalisation of Islam in the region, the perception that there exists a differential treatment between the poor northern states and the more developed south has been a crucial factor in the recent upsurge of violence. In the north, the feeling of injustice is rampant. Oil, produced in the Niger delta in the south, is the country’s primary financial resource and yields approximately 60 billion dollars each year (2010). However, the federal system which characterises Nigeria has led to a highly unequal distribution of these revenues: while 13% goes to the oil-producing states, the rest depends on the leanings of the government (who, in addition, takes a mighty piece out of the lion’s share). The south has always been favoured, notably in the hope of easing activists in the Niger delta and of preventing oil from getting out of the country. The north, on the other hand, has been deprived of its rightful share, leading to a feeling of alienation from the government. Today, three quarters of northerners live on less than 200 dollars a year. Furthermore, the Nigerian tradition of alternating between a southern Christian president and northern Muslim one, was ended when Goodluck Jonathan succeeded Olesegun Obasanjo, who died before the end of his mandate. Northerners have found the appointment of Jonathan, a Christian from the south, very hard to swallow.

It is difficult to assess how to best tackle the issue. Boko Haram is said to have become a “franchise that anyone can buy into” and needs to be looked at from several perspectives. Although there is an urgent need to put an end to the massacres that Nigeria is witnessing and to the threat of civil war, it would be a mistake to solely deal with the Muslim sect as a security issue. In 2009, the killing of Mohamed Yusuf showed that the death of a terrorist group’s leader was insufficient to annihilate it. More generally, the harshness of the response, which has been essentially military, is said to have fuelled the violence. The need for economic readjustment, on the other hand, is urgent. A bit of governance reform and human development wouldn’t be a bad idea either. But as economic development expert Jeffrey Sachs asserted in a New York Times article, “at 155 million people and rising, Nigeria is the world’s eighth most-populous country and one of the hardest to govern…Very few [countries] come close to Nigeria’s scale and complexity of challenges.”

While Americans may not have so much to worry about regarding their homeland security, Mr Jonathan, on the other hand, has serious reasons to be disquieted given the gargantuan task ahead of him.

The British quality newspaper The Guardian dedicated the week from 21^st to 26^th of March to… France. A very kind initiative, or so it first seemed when I heard this information at breakfast time on France Inter.

“New Europe” is a weekly series of articles dedicated to Britain’s continental neighbours, apparently motivated by the wish to build a bridge over the Channel. In the case of France, the initiative looked more like an exercise of autosuggestion… Falling in the trap of stereotypes, several articles try to convince the readers that the French are respectable people despite  their rudeness, strikes, pills, sexism, and even “failure to wash”.

However, one article starts with this assertion: “The French distrust us”. Distrust and dislike is indeed a historical feature of the relations between the peoples of France and Great Britain, explained by the two countries’ many shared (demographic, economic, geographic) characteristics as well as by their traditional divides on European integration and defence, attitudes towards the United States and foreign interventions – to name but just a few.

Following a rapprochement on European defence initiated 15 years ago by Britain and France at Saint-Malo,  the two countries have recently seemed to abandon their respective long-time bros (Germany on the one hand, America on the other) in favour of a bilateral long-term commitment that’s putting the rest of diplomatic alliances in the shade. Since November 2010, it has been repeated in the media, in political discourses as well as in the treaty, that France and Britain share a common (strategic) vision and that no situation is envisaged where the national interest of one party would be threatened without that of the other party being at stake. Trust and friendship thus seem to characterise high-level relations between the two countries. Still, the profound split between Paris and London over Iraq was less than a decade ago. At the time, the French Minister of foreign affairs (Dominique de Villepin) asserted:

“To those who choose the use of force and think that they can resolve the complexity of the world by a rapid and preventive action, we oppose a long-term determined action.”

In 2003, France was seating on the side of Germany, opposing the UK, the US, Spain and Italy, and advocated negotiations rather than military intervention. Now,what if France had opposed intervention in Libya in 2011? The circumstances of intervention in Iraq and in Libya are of course very different (be it only regarding the UN resolution), but if the present agreement between London and Paris on Libya has somewhat buried Iraq, a future divergence over foreign intervention could in turn bury Libya.  Today, the risk is limited. The Anglo-French relationship has not been one of fierce opposition since the end of Gaullism, and even less so since the end of Thatcherism. Plus, since Nicolas Sarkozy came to power, the French strategic posture towards the “Anglo-Saxon” world has shifted, the President being even called “the American” in the US. Indeed, he built a close relationship with George W. Bush, proceeded to the return of France in NATO’s integrated command and Wikileaks recently revealed that he disagreed with the French “excessive” position over Iraq.

Just as diplomatic proximity between Britain and France was getting more concrete, Paris and Berlin started to fall out of love. France and Germany used to be the drivers of the development of European security and defence tools and policies. But today, Germany is being criticised (including by France) for refusing to intervene in Libya, and even accused to “sink European defence”. Of course, Paris-Berlin is still the main economic axis in the European Union, and the ties between France and Germany are too strong to break over Libya, but criticism against Berlin’s refusal to use force is reaching new heights.

Looking at the dark side of things, France’s recent diplomatic reorientation highlights the fact that national interests, and the decisions made to preserve those interests, have a tendency to shift regularly. There is a presidential election in 2012 and Sarkozy will not necessarily be re-elected. Should the Left (or a Gaullist right-wing candidate) come to power, the country might undergo a new strategic shift that could damage the Anglo-French Alliance. In the long run, the newlyweds will have to share more than stereotypes, as they have embarked on a trip where they will be flying wing to wing for the next decades.

“After a 30-year winter of sectarian violence, Northern Ireland today has the promise of a springtime of peace.” It is with these words of hope that the former US President Bill Clinton commented the signing of the Belfast Agreement on April 10^th 1998 which put an end to years of bloodshed and centuries of tensions. Yet, less than two weeks ago, on April 2^nd, Ronan Kerr, a Catholic Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) officer, was murdered by dissident republicans when a bomb exploded under his car. Thirteen years after the Belfast Agreement, terrorist attacks have suddenly increased and cast doubt on the durability of the peace process in Northern Ireland.

‘The Troubles’ evolved from 1969 to the end of the twentieth century and led to the deaths of over 3 500 people. The Good Friday Agreement finally addressed the deep rooted causes of the conflict. Based on compromise and inclusiveness, it led to the creation of a successful power-sharing government. The main Loyalist and Nationalist terrorist groups such as the UVF, UDA and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), agreed to put an end to their campaigns and had their weapons decommissioned. In 1995, the European Union launched its Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland. Two other EU PEACE programmes followed over the years and in total almost two billion euros will have been invested in peace and reconciliation initiatives in Northern Ireland by 2013. On paper, all signs seem to point to the success of the peace process in Northern Ireland and the progress of stability and reconciliation.

Yet, according to various sources there has been a recent surge in paramilitary activities in the country. As stated by the MI5, these dissident republican groups are the Continuity IRA, the Real IRA as well as Óglaigh na hÉireann (the “soldiers of Ireland”) and were formed after successive splits within the PIRA. As far as the other side is concerned, there has been no evidence of recent activity from dissident loyalist groups.

On March 27th, a bomb containing 50 kg of explosives was left outside a courthouse in Derry and the attack was blamed on dissident republicans. Back in March 2009, the Real IRA killed two British soldiers and the Continuity IRA was responsible for the death of a policeman. More recently, August 2010 was a particularly violent month: the Real IRA intensified its campaign and planted booby traps and car bombs in various areas. On August 3^rd, a car containing 200lb of explosives exploded outside the Derry police station, damaging several businesses. The MI5’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre has classified the threat level as “severe” in Northern Ireland and “substantial” in Great Britain. Even more alarming, the threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism was published for the first time on 24 September 2010. Before that, the MI5 would only assess the international terrorist threat.

In November 2010, King’s College’s International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) published a report entitled “Return of the Militants: Violent Dissident Republicanism”. This study stresses that republican dissident groups have increased their activity and still represent a possible threat for both Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom. It points out that the rise in activities by these hardline splinter groups was not expected by security forces.

For the author of this report, Martyn Frampton, Northern Ireland finds itself at a critical moment because two generations are coming together and joining the ranks of militant dissident groups. These generations are the disaffected youths and delinquents that did not witness the violence of the “Troubles” along with veterans from the Provisional IRA who rejected the power-sharing Northern Ireland Assembly and feel disillusioned by Sinn Fein and what they see as unkept promises. In the next four years, 245 million pounds of additional funding will be paid to help the PSNI, the successor to the controversial Royal Ulster Constabulary, struggle against attacks from dissident groups. This need for extra funds highlights the new intensity of the threats which have been at their highest since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

Could the resurgence of terrorist attacks reflect the stagnation of post-conflict peace in Northern Ireland? The advancements that have been made since the 1998 Agreement need to be put into perspective. The number of “peace walls” that were built to divide rival Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods has increased. In his article for the Financial Times, “Downturn puts Northern Ireland peace under fire”, John Murray Brown states that since the ceasefire, these walls have grown from 18 to 88. Sectorisation is still pervasive and today, integrated education covers only 9 per cent of schoolchildren. The massive injection of funds by the EU into Northern Ireland has now proved to have its limits as far as changing mentalities is concerned; economic aid is not sufficient without a solid strategy for peace.

Mari Fitzduff explains that a conflict never ends, it only evolves. This could perfectly reflect the case of Northern Ireland. The 1998 peace resolution led to idealistic hopes that were rapidly transformed into a certain disenchantment. This is epitomized by the recent resurgence of paramilitary activity which represents an unsettling and unexpected threat to peace in Northern Ireland. Yet are the growing number of attacks only part of the post-conflict path to peace or could they mean that the Troubles are back?

Dana Priest and William Arkin’s reporting on Top Secret America in the Washington Post was an important media event. Its various graphs and installments nicely illustrate the sheer magnitude of US intelligence privatization. Mind you, the size and the compartmentalization of the US intelligence community is difficult to grasp and a cause for many problems of its own. Add to that the even more elusive layers of contracting and sub-contracting (an estimated 265’000 contractors have top-secret clearances) and one gets a security state that has grown beyond that what anyone can call reasonable by a long stretch of imagination. (If only McNulty had a fraction of that cash for the fight against drugs in Baltimore…)

Here are a few more thoughts on both the content and the style of the WaPo story.

First off, the sprawling privatization of US intelligence is, of course, hardly news to the engaged reader. The WaPo must be criticized for not even referring to Tim Shorrock, the real authority on this subject. He was the first author to have studied post 9/11 intelligence contracting, and he did it in a much more systematic and problem-centered fashion (albeit with less colorful graphs and less floury language on Washington suburbia). His book, Spies for Hire, is a compelling read that tells us why, where and how the US arrived at a situation where an incredible 70 percent of its enormous intelligence budget ends up in the hands of private companies. One can also find his data set, here. Shorrock obtained an unclassified document from the office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) that corroborates his basic estimate. After his book release, the CIA and the main stream media (MSM) simply ignored Shorrock’s research. The former called his figures ‘way off the mark’ and the latter shunned an awfully gripping story. Why? Surely, it would be too simplistic to associate big advertising companies of MSM, such as Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman with this. Fact is, though, it took MSM a long time to pick it up. [...]

The Guardian released last week declassified documents incriminating the previous British government (Tony Blair’s) of extraordinary rendition and of involvement in torture. Just over a year after President Obama released what are now known as the torture memos, which justified the use of torture in the War on Terror, the new British coalition government decided to shed light on its country’s involvement in similar practices. It was the Binyam Mohammed case which earlier this year ignited the debate on the involvement of the UK in torture and extraordinary rendition.

Whilst analysis of the documents themselves should be left to the lawyers, who believe it will take 10 years to investigate the 500,000 documents related to this affair, a couple of preliminary observations are in order.

Despite being rendered public over a year after the US’ torture memos, these documents testify a clear will for change from a newly constituted British government. Last year, the US release of the torture memos coincided with the newly elected Obama administration and in similar fashion, the UK’s newly elected coalition decided to investigate torture allegations only 2 months after its accession to power. Unlike the US, however, which had decided not to prosecute those guilty of torture, the UK decided to fully investigate these allegations and take action following the release of these documents.

In the UK’s documents it appears clear that there is no will to render torture more accessible: acts of torture are clearly forbidden, stress and duress techniques are prohibited and the papers clearly outline that prosecution is to be expected if these methods are found to have been used.
Yet, extraordinary rendition is evidently accounted for in these documents and breaches international law. Whilst acknowledging that prisoners were being treated inhumanely (“It appears that prisoners may not be being treated in accordance with the appropriate standards. Given that they are not within our custody or control the law does not require you to intervene to prevent this”), in Guantanamo by the US, the British government still allowed for British nationals to be sent to the American prison based in Cuba (“Subsequent to this Mubanga was handed over to US authorities and renditioned to GTMO”). Such actions were taken despite article 3.1 of the UN Convention Against Torture stating that:

“No State Party shall expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”.

The ongoing investigation is bound to reveal more about New Labour’s involvement in torture and extraordinary rendition, however it is less sure that the full investigation will be rendered public, as David Cameron stated last week, and that it will be able to restore the UK’s reputation as well as trust in Mi5 and Mi6. Only time will tell.

Interagency cooperation is a fancy word. The goal is legitimate: be more efficient, share information, and optimize human, financial, technical resources. Get more results, especially when war, COIN, or intelligence failures prove how necessary it is to work together. However cooperation is a serious job, not to be undertaken lightly. Indeed competition remains strong between individuals and institutions afraid of losing their influence, usefulness, resources, independence, efficiency, etc. Here are some reasons to be cautious about cooperation and some options to build stronger foundations for collaboration.

1. Cooperation means losing vision. While cooperating, making sense of an action is more difficult because working together means consensus. Consensus requires to give up something, which often means losing the strategic vision in order to make everybody agree with the result. Partners will for example agree on words without checking their exact translations in each other’s languages. Building a common strategic vision is not always necessary (see the different visions of the EU of the UK, France and Germany; or NATO in Afghanistan) but it is always difficult, takes time, resources, and political will.

2. Cooperation may imply loosing expertise. Indeed specific expertise gets lost when institutions are “fused”.. Each bureaucratic culture implies specific savoir-faire which are difficult to preserve, especially as they are not easy to detect and value. In civil-military relations, militaries may be afraid of civilians having the expertise (the power) needed to really lead and control them or on the contrary fear those who are lacking that exact expertise to take the right decisions.

3. Cooperation is a dubious instrument of political control. Cooperation is not an efficient tool to ensure political control over an institution. National policy makers may believe that too strong closeness between institutions could mean that they will lose control of their actions if they cannot exert strong control over them (divide to rule, used to be the French tradition for the police system). At the international level, one may see some alliances of national bureaucracies trying to promote global agreements that will then be imposed on national leaders (the CAD of the OECD can play at times this role, but it is not the only one). Or political leaders may consider that the only way to control institutions is to force them to cooperate (British example). Anyways, both are illusions, since a leader’s capacity to control the bureaucracy will also depend on many other factors.

Furthermore, it’s not only about deciding to cooperate, it’s also about how one goes about cooperating. Options matter. [...]

Barack Obama accepted General McChrystal’s resignation as ISAF’s commander in chief last week and replaced him with his former superior, the now famous general Petraeus. This decision was taken only a few days after a Rolling Stone article, The Runaway General, was published. In this interview, McChrystal and, especially his staff, criticized and at times reviled civilian members of the Obama administration in charge of Afghanistan.

This raises questions: about Afghanistan, the Obama administration and the American decision-making process in general. But let’s start from the beginning, namely by bringing the article itself into question.

Strangely enough the downpour of comments and discussions this article by Michael Hastings has sparked, have largely failed to state the obvious: this piece is both unimpressive and biased. While it is Hastings’ right to strongly disapprove of the engagement in Afghanistan and of counterinsurgency in general, it is also the reader’s right to expect a well argued critique especially from someone who has spent much time around ‘Team America’. Yet apart from a few hints to the failure of the Marjah operation, corruption and also a couple of simplifications (for instance regarding the resignation of the German president in May), precious little is said about Afghanistan. By the end of the article it is rather clear that the author arrived in Kabul prejudiced against COIN and with an already made mind: “So far, counterinsurgency has succeeded only in creating a never-ending demand for the primary product supplied by the military: perpetual war.” His view on Petraeus’ nomination to McChrystal’s former post seems of the same stripe.

What’s more is the dishonest talent, with which Hastings manages to mix hasty analyses, juicy gossip and personal details (what’s the wife’s general got to do with this?). Amid this whirlwind, a carefully crafted picture seems to emerge: that of a bunch of officers both cynical and arrogant, opposed to civilian authorities – and in fact to all who do not share their views – and who seem more bent on denigrating their Beltway enemies than on running the war. The shady jokes and other offending comments, which led to McChrystal’s suspension, (“Biden? Did you say Bite me?”, Eikenberry’s ’treason’), are evidently highlighted throughout the article. As it happens, I have myself spent a month in Afghanistan, in July 2009, with general McChrystal and his staff: never have I heard any comments of the sort. I’m ready to believe that these were private chats and that the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan may have brought about a poisoned atmosphere, yet I can’t help but think that these comments were merely small talk, in a Parisian bar, that Hastings systematically took out of context to reinforce this impression of obnoxious feelings.

The general’s lack of judgment is clearly to be deplored: Why give an interview to a non-specialized journalist? Why on earth in Rolling Stone? Why did McChrystal and his staff allowed the paper to be published and why weren’t the facts contested? Amongst all hypotheses heard in the past week (disbelief, fatigue, professional fault, Machiavellic plan to be disassociated from a predictable failure in Afghanistan….) the most plausible one seems to be a basic disregard of what supposed to remain off the record, and a paper already circulated anyways.

In books to come specialized journalists and historians will shed light on this affair – Tom Ricks must already be at work on Fiasco 2. Yet this pathetic situation calls for a deeper analysis of its consequences on the mission in Afghanistan and civil-military relations in the US. [...]

Eurosatory’s Think Tank village organised Wednesday last week its second conference on the future of land warfare. A podcast is already available for you to listen to but first here are the broad lines of what was said in the three presentations.

Is counterinsurgency the Future of Land Warfare ? (Etienne de Durand):

• Warfare is a chameleon and its future evolution remains thus uncertain.
• From a French point of view, COIN (“counter-rebellion”) is but a specific sub-genre of irregular warfare and is mingled with peacekeeping and other tactical modes; therefore the main question decision makers should ask themselves is whether or not irregular operations will represent the future of land warfare.
• Large scale, high-intensity conflicts are unlikely in the present geostrategic context; the few conventional campaigns that are likely to happen will most likely take place at sea or in the air. Therefore, from an Army perspective, it makes sense to prepare mostly for irregular warfare.
• Irregular Warfare is more than just light infantry. It requires tactical mobility, precision fires, protection and more generally a lot of technology, as insurgents themselves also have access to modern technologies.
• At least for European armies, medium forces are likely to become the dominant model in terms of force structures.

A British point of view on hybrid warfare (Olivier Grouille):

• The British MOD and Army are at a strategic crossroad (overstretched financially, in the middle of a strategic defence review, an with new coalition government).
• A common understanding exists that a return to COIN as a mode of operations will have to take place within the British army.
• The UK needs to be prepared for both conventional and irregular warfare.
• Hybrid warfare will represent the future of many operations and state on state warfare itself could become hybrid.
• An adaptation of British troops will be necessary through education and training.
• The UK will not enter major operations alone in the future and cooperation will be necessary.

Insurgencies in tribal, clan societies (Jean-Jacques Patry):

• New wars of various intensities have emerged and have changed the security equation in the twenty-first century.
• Two types insurgencies should be distinguished: one that aims at gaining state power (classic Maoïst model) whilst the other tries to deny the (re)emergence of the state (typical of tribal societies like Afghanistan).
• Without a local state structure it is impossible to launch a successful COIN campaign. In other words, “winning hearts and minds” does not work when facing state-denying insurgencies.
• Powersharing is the solution to stabilise local actors. Once power is shared in a stable way it becomes possible to launch a COIN operation against the remaining insurgents.

If you wish to hear the full length recording of the conference please click below:

Etienne de Durand – Is COIN the Future of Land Warfare?:

Olivier Grouille – A British View on Hybrid Warfare:

Jean-Jacques Patry – Insurgencies in Tribal / Clan Societies:

By Vivien Pertusot

Security cooperation in the Gulf remains marginal. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has been actively dealing with economic issues, but has yet to fulfill its potential as a regional security forum. Many impediments and setbacks have crippled the organization and prevented it from heading in that direction. However, the unfolding instability in Yemen has stirred up many reactions among the GCC that could bring about an increased cooperation in the security field.

The GCC is composed of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. It was founded in 1981 partly as a reaction to the Iran-Iraq War. While economic issues have always prevailed, security has been a constant yet largely unaddressed concern. The members have never been able to reach consensus on those issues. Several reasons justify the lack of security cooperation. First of all, distrust among members remains detrimental to such an aim. As the regional heavyweight, Saudi Arabia still arouses wariness among its small neighbors who fear that their voice would not be heard and consequently cherish their autonomy. Despite significant efforts in recent years, some territorial disputes still plague the region as the recent naval skirmish between Saudi Arabia and the UAE illustrates. While we may think that the GCC could play a role in the resolution of those disputes, a careful analysis proves us wrong. For instance, when Saudi Arabia and Qatar came to an agreement in 2001 to terminate their disputes, the GCC was not at the negotiation table.

Moreover, the Gulf countries have long given up on defense policies to rely on the U.S. security umbrella. Anthony Cordesman explains that the Gulf countries are important arms importers, but their defense policies are too inchoate and lack an overarching guidance as well as a military structure for an efficient use of those materials. Since they heavily depend on the U.S. presence in the region, they have been overlooking the potential of developing common and interoperable armed forces.

Finally, those countries struggle to agree on a common definition of threats, which of Iran, Iraq, or Yemen should be of prime concern to the GCC remains undecided. The organization has been virtually AWOL from the war in Iraq and still shies away from providing assistance in the reconstruction phase. The contrasting views on Iran have led the GCC to reach a standstill. Until recently, Yemen was a topic on which most agreed but none wanted to take the bull by the horns.

Have the incursions in Saudi Arabia by the Houthi rebels last November fostered a wind of change? It was the first time since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 that a GCC country was attacked and the organization took a strong stand. It asserted in an official statement that an attack against Saudi Arabia was deemed an attack against all the GCC countries. As much as this wording could suggest the rationale of a collective defense organization, no such policy exists within the Council. There have also been unfruitful talks to deploy a rapid reaction force. It was not the first time such an idea came up, and it is still floating around.

Despite some encouraging signs, those efforts seemed more quixotic than indicating real change in policy. No common security strategy exists within the GCC and no negotiations are taking place towards that aim. As long as no country leads the way and the relations with Iran and Iraq are not sorted out, a vapid status quo will remain.

Earlier this month, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism submitted a “compilation of good practices and institutional frameworks and measures that ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies while countering terrorism, including on their oversight” to the UN Human Rights Council.

Despite its cumbersome title, this annotated enumeration of 35 examples of good practice is certainly worth reading. It contains a comprehensive and well-structured account of what national intelligence laws and institutional frameworks for intelligence services could look like. This compilation is the outcome of a consultation process where Governments, experts and practitioners provided input in various different ways. I’ve been asked to give comments on an earlier draft and hope that the following general thought on this kind of best practice advocacy might be of interest to Ultima Ratio readers.

What exactly is the objective of this report? It is interesting how A/HRC/14/46 fails to provide a clear statement of purpose. In the introduction, the Special Rapporteur states that “it is not the purpose of this compilation to promulgate a set of normative standards that should apply at all times and in all parts of the world”. Fine, this should not be read as a blueprint for all nations to follow. But what then is its purpose?

Possibly, this was a contentious issue for the various parties that have contributed to the consultation process. National governments, academic experts, the UN bureaucracy and professional consultants are likely to pursue different and potentially conflicting objectives. Perhaps, then, the author felt compelled not to spell this out in further detail. If this was the case, it would illustrate one of the numerous problems with (or better: constraints of) such mandated research. All too often it is the logic of the consultation process rather than the logic of an empirical enquiry that is decisive in the end. This is all the more deplorable because the latter can generate custom-tailored and sustainable policy recommendations for intelligence governance, too. [...]