Dr. Shahram Chubin est non-resident Senior Associate à la Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Né en Iran et de nationalité suisse, il a fait ses études en Grande-Bretagne et aux Etats-Unis. Il a été Directeur des Regional Security Studies à l’IISS (1977-81) et a enseigné dans plusieurs universités comme la Graduate School of International Studies à Genève, la Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts), Oxford, Harvard et Columbia. Spécialiste des problèmes sécuritaires au Moyen-Orient, il a notamment été consultant après du Département américain de la Défense et de l’Onu.
Son nouveau Proliferation Paper est téléchargeable ici.
In the long standoff regarding its nuclear ambition, Iran has cultivated ambiguity and been loath to reliably assure the international community of its ultimate intentions, complicating Western efforts to understand, let alone constrain, Tehran’s endeavors. While many analyses have focused on how to prevent or contain a potential nuclear-armed Iran, the posture Iran would adopt once it has developed its nuclear weapons remains elusive. This paper highlights that while opting for command-and-control (C2) arrangements, Iran would have to reconcile two contrasting imperatives: first, to disperse assets and decentralize C2 to minimize the risks and potential damages of a disabling strike, which has been seen as a real – even imminent – threat in recent years. A contrasting concern emerged as the Iranian Revolutionay Guards’ Corps became a key formulator and executor of Tehran’s security policy: how to guard against the risk of unauthorized use of major weapons systems? Among the factors that could influence Iran’s choices in terms of C2 arrangements, this paper focuses on Tehran’s national security experience, the lessons it may have derived from it, as well as from the experience of other countries.
Iran’s Decision-Making, the IRGC and Command and Control